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Schuldt: Schuldt: Reaffirmation of Precedent

REAFFIRMATION OF PRECEDENT:

THE CONTINUING SAGA OF LOAN
GUARANTEES AND SHAREHOLDER

BASIS IN SUBCHAPTER S
CORPORATIONS
Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner'

INTRODUCTION

In 1958, Congress enacted Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code. 2
The purposes behind the legislation included allowing certain businesses3
to select the corporate entity form and allow the corporation's income and
losses to flow through to the shareholder for inclusion on the shareholder's
personal return at individual tax rates. 4 Of particular significance is the
pass through of losses, which allows the shareholder to offset the loss
against current income from alternate sources. However, the Code limits
this pass through of losses and other deductions to the sum of the share-

holder's adjusted basis in the stock of the S corporation and the indebtedness
of the S corporation to him.5 To maximize the pass through of losses,

1. 90 T.C. 206 (1988).
2. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1986) (original version was I.R.C. §§ 1371-1377
(1958)). For a description of the 1958 proposal, see S. REP. No. 1983, 85th Cong.,
2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4791, 4876.
3. There are various requirements for electing subchapter S status. For an
exhaustive discussion of the eligibility requirements for electing subchapter S status,
see J. EusTIcE & J. KuNTz, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF S CORPORAnONS, ch.
3 (rev. ed. 1985).
4. B. Br=Fr & J. EusTcE, FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS
AND SHAREHOLDERS

§ 6.01, at 6-2 (5th ed. 1987).

5. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1986) provides:
(d) Special rules for losses and deductions.
(1) Cannot exceed shareholder's basis in stock and debt. The aggregate

amount of losses and deductions taken into account by a shareholder
under subsection (a) for any taxable year shall not exceed the sum of(A) the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock in the S corporation ...
and

(B) the shareholders adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the S corporation
to the shareholder.
For a comparison with the former section 1374 provision, see infra note 28.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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shareholders strongly desire to generate sufficient basis in both stock and
6
debt.
There are numerous ways a shareholder can increase his basis in the
stock of an S corporation or in its indebtedness to him.7 One way is to
allow a shareholder's personal guarantee of a corporate debt to increase
either stock or indebtedness basis, thus allowing a more generous conduit
for losses and deductions.' Historically, the arguments for an increase in
basis in indebtedness have been uniformly rejected. 9 However, dicta in
certain cases has indicated that such guarantees may increase stock basis.
Moreover, a recent decision, Selfe v. United States, 0 held that a shareholder
may increase his or her basis in the stock of an S corporation where the
court views the loan guarantee, in substance, as a loan from the lender
to the shareholder with the shareholder subsequently advancing the proceeds
to the corporation." The Selfe decision was a particularly significant departure from prior authority.
In February of 1988, the United States Tax Court reconsidered the
loan guarantee issue in Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner.'2 The Tax Court
held that a shareholder guarantee of S corporation debt, absent any actual
payment on such loan guarantee, will not increase the shareholder's basis
of indebtedness. 3 The court explicitly rejected the analysis of Selfe"4 and
held that absent any economic outlay, a loan guarantee will not increase
5
the shareholder's stock basis.'
This Note compares and contrasts the divergent approaches taken by
the majority and dissent concerning shareholder guarantees of S corporation
debt. The majority takes a "pure" substance over form approach: without
regard to debt-equity principles, the shareholder must prove that the guarantees were, in substance, loans from the bank to the shareholder who

6. Comment, Subchapter S Loss Limitation: The Effect of Shareholder
Loan Guarantees on Basis, 40 Sw. L.J. 1241, 1241 (1986).
7. Such methods for increasing stock basis include contributing cash to the
corporation, purchasing additional stock, or contributing property to the corporation.
Methods for increasing basis in the indebtedness from the corporation to the
shareholder include lending cash, borrowing personally from a lender then lending
the proceeds to the corporation, paying a corporate debt guaranteed by the shareholder, and, subject to certain conditions, substituting a shareholder's note for a
shareholder-guaranteed corporate debt. See J. EusrICE & J. KUNrz, supra note 3,
§ 10.03[2] (discussing successful and unsuccessful methods of stock and debt basis
generation).
8. Comment, supra note 6, at 1241.
9. See cases cited infra notes 47 and 60.
10. 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985).
11. Id. at 773.
12. 90 T.C. 206 (1988).
13. Id. at 212.
14. Id. at 216.
15. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/14
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subsequently contributed the proceeds to the S corporation. 16 By contrast,
the dissent uses a debt-equity approach: debt-equity principles should be
applied to determine the substance of a shareholder loan guarantee, 17 and
application of such principles is intertwined with the substance over form
analysis.
Leavitt involved a subchapter S corporation, VAFLA Corporation
(VAFLA), formed in 1979 to operate an amusement park in Florida.' 8
Petitioners paid $10,000 for their shares.' 9 In August, petitioners and other
shareholders signed guarantee agreements, with each shareholder agreeing
to be jointly and severally liable for all indebtedness of VAFLA to the
Bank of Virginia. 20 On September 12, 1979 VAFLA borrowed $300,000
2
from the Bank of Virginia to fund current and future operating deficits. 1
Seven shareholders, including petitioners, guaranteed the loan personally,
22
and the loan's approval hinged directly on the wealth of the guarantors.
VAFLA consistently displayed the loan as a shareholder loan on its financial
statements and tax returns, but VAFLA made all interest and principal
payments to the Bank of Virginia and neither VAFLA nor petitioners
23
characterized such payments as constructive dividends.
In the taxable years ending September 30, 1979, 1980 and 1981, VAFLA
suffered mounting net operating losses.24 Petitioners deducted losses on

their personal tax returns in excess of $10,000,25 with the Commissioner

disallowing the excess. 26 Petitioners contended that "their guarantees of
the $300,000 loan to the corporation ... increased their basis in their
stock sufficiently to allow deductions for their proportionate share of losses
attributable to the corporation during the years in issue." 27 The Commissioner contended that under former section 1374(c)(2) of the Code pe-

16. Id. at 213-14.
17. Id. at 223.
18. Id.at 208.
19. Id.Petitioners (plural) in this instance refer to the estates of Daniel and
Evelyn Leavitt, and Charles D. Fox, III, Executor, consolidated with the case
involving Anthony D. and Marjorie F. Cuzzocrea. Id. at 206 n.1.
20. Id. at 208-09.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.at 208.
25. Id.
26. Id.at 210.
27. Id.
28. Former I.R.C. § 1374(c) (1958) provided, in part:
(2) Limitation.- A shareholder's portion of the net operating loss of an
electing small business corporation for any taxable year shall not exceed
the sum of(A) the adjusted basis ...of the shareholders stock in the electing small
business corporation, determined as of the close of the taxable year of
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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29
titioners could not deduct losses in excess of their $10,000 stock basis.

SUBSTANCE OVER FoRm
Central to the petitioners' argument was a "substance over form" view
of the guarantee transaction. 0 Petitioners argued that the transaction was,
in substance, a loan from the bank to petitioners followed by the contribution of the loan proceeds to the corporation's capital, thus resulting
3
in a basis-increasing capital investment. '
The Supreme Court first recognized the substance over form doctrine
in its 1935 decision of Gregory v. Helvering. 2 In Gregory, the Court found
that a corporate reorganization by the taxpayer, while facially complying
with the Code statute, was nonetheless "an elaborate and devious form
of conveyance masquerading as a corporate reorganization, and nothing
else." '3 3 The Court thus held that the substance of the transaction controlled
the tax effects. More recently, in Diedrich v. Commissioner,34 the Court
reiterated that "the 'reality,' not the form of the transaction ... gov-

ern[s].''

35

While courts and the commissioner exalt substance over form reasoning,
they nonetheless often require taxpayers to stick to their chosen form of
the transaction. As noted in Legg v. Commissioner:36 "[a] taxpayer cannot
elect a specific course of action and then when finding himself in an adverse
situation extricate himself by applying the age old theory of substance over
form." ' 37 Although the tax consequences of a chosen transactional form

the corporation . .. , and
(B) the adjusted basis ... of any indebtedness of the corporation to the

shareholder, determined as of the close of the taxable year of the corporation....
In 1982, Congress revised the subchapter S rules in the Subchapter S Revision Act
of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982). The limitations described in
former section 1374 were reenacted in section 2 of the Subchapter S Revision Act
of 1982 at I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1982). Future references in this Note will refer to
the current section 1366(d)(1) of the Code.
29. 90 T.C. at 210.
30. See generally Isenbergh, Musings on Form and Substance in Taxation,
49 U. Cm. L. REv. 859 (1982); Comment, Substance Versus Form in the Interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, 1967 U. oF ILL. LAW. F. 816.

31. 90 T.C. at 212.

32. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
33. Id. at 470.
34. 457 U.S. 191 (1982).
35. Id. at 196.
36. 57 T.C. 164 (1971).
37. Id. at 169.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/14
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may constrain taxpayers,38 the Internal Revenue Service and courts freely
can look behind the "face value" of a transaction and make a "careful
scrutiny" to determine its substance.3 9 This tenet appears to give the
Commissioner a "sword and a shield-the Commissioner's sword cuts both
ways, but the taxpayer has been unable to penetrate the Commissioner's

shield of form."

4

In the long history of cases involving shareholder guarantees of loans
to subchapter S corporations, the substance over form argument has met
with little success. 4' In Brown v Commissioner,42 the Sixth Circuit stated

the general rule for guaranteed transactions: "[p]etitioners are liable for
the tax consequences of the transaction that they actually executed; they
may not reap the benefits of some other transaction that they might have
effected instead. ' 43 Accordingly, shareholders who wish to guarantee creditor loans, and then use a substance over form argument to increase stock
or indebtedness basis fight an uphill battle. In the shareholder guarantee
context, only the Selfe decision has approved such an argument, and only
45
under limited circumstances.

38. See Commissioner v. National Alfalfa Dehydrating & Milling Co., 417
U.S. 134 (1974). The Court noted:
[t]his Court has observed repeatedly that, while a taxpayer is free to
organize his affairs as he chooses, nevertheless, once having done so, he
must accept the tax consequences of his choice whether contemplated or
not ... and may not enjoy the benefit of some other route he might

have chosen to follow but did not.
Id. at 149. Similarly, in Central Tablet Mfg. Co. v. United States, 417 U.S. 673,
690 (1974), the Court stated "[t]ax consequences follow what has taken place, not
what might have taken place."
39. Silverstein v. United States, 349 F. Supp. 527, 532 (E.D. Va. 1972)
(quoting Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 483, 484 (5th Cir. 1948)).
40. Comment, supra note 30, at 817 (footnotes omitted) (citing Bergash v.
Commissioner, 43 T.C. 743 (1965), aff'd, 361 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1966); Holz v.
United States, 176 F. Supp. 330 (D. Minn. 1959); Gallagher v. Commissioner, 39
T.C. 144 (1962)).
41. Brown v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1460, 1463-64 (1981), aff'd,
706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983) (form of transaction was not a loan from credit
corporation to petitioners, who loaned the funds to the bank; substance involved
a guarantee which matched the form); Thompson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M.
(CCH) 157, 162 (1977) (taxpayer was a guarantor; refusal to hold that he "had
a different role"); Duke v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 229, 231 (1976) (court
refused to view guarantee transactions as constructive loans; view would "distort
the actualities").
42. 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'g Brown v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1460 (1981).
43. 706 F.2d at 756.
44. Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d 769 (11th Cir. 1985); see also supra
note 10 and accompanying text.
45. In Selfe, the court placed emphasis on the fact that the notes guaranteed
by the shareholder were issued by a "thinly capitalized corporation and had more
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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FROM CORPORATION TO SHAREHOLDER

In Leavitt the majority and dissent disposed of any arguments concerning an increase in basis of indebtedness from the corporation to the
shareholder. 46 The majority noted that:
the fact that [the] shareholders may be primarily liable on indebtedness
of a corporation to a third party does not mean that this indebtedness
is "indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholder" within the meaning
of section 1374(c)(2)(B). No form of indirect borrowing, be it guaranty,
surety, accommodation, comaking or otherwise, gives rise to indebtedness
from the corporation to the shareholders until and unless the shareholders
pay part or all of the obligation . .

.7

Petitioners in Leavitt had never been required to pay any of the loan they
guaranteed, 48 and thus were denied any indebtedness basis increase. In many
reported cases, and as the majority noted in Leavitt,4 9 an actual investment
or economic outlay is required for a basis increase."0 The economic outlay

equity characteristics than debt." 778 F.2d at 774. The court also noted that central
to the substance over form argument was the fact that the loan to the corporation
was secured by the taxpayer's personal property, and that the bank was primarily
looking to the taxpayer for repayment. Id. at 771. However, whether the bank
actually looked to the taxpayer for repayment was unclear, and thus this factual
issue was to be determined upon remand. Id. at 771-72 n.3.
46. 90 T.C. at 211, 220.
47. Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206, 211 (1988) (quoting
Raynor v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 762, 770-71 (1968)); see also Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755, 756 (6th Cir. 1983); Underwood v. Commissioner, 535
F.2d 309, 312 (5th Cir. 1976); Harrington v. United States, 605 F. Supp. 53, 56
(D. Del. 1985); Neal v. United States, 313 F. Supp. 393, 396 (C.D. Cal. 1970);
Williams v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 844, 848 (1981); Albert v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 591, 595-96 (1980); Mirow v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M.
(CCH) 628, 630-31 (1975); Parson v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 789, 792
(1974), aff'd mem., 554 F.2d 1070 (9th Cir. 1977); Frankel v. Commissioner, 61
T.C. 343, 347 (1973); Prashker v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 172, 177 (1972); Borg
v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 257, 264-65 (1968); Priv. Ltr. Rul. 84-26-006 (June 29,
1984).
48. Estate of Leavitt v. Commissioner, 90 T.C. 206, 212 (1988).
49. Id.
50. Id. at 217 (citing Perry v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1293, 1296 (1970)).
The Leavitt majority also found support in the language of the report of the
Committee on Finance of the Senate:
The amount of the net operating loss apportioned to any shareholder
pursuant to the above rule is limited under section 1374(c)(2) to the adjusted
basis of the shareholder's investment in the corporation; that is, to the
adjusted basis of the stock in the corporation owned by the shareholder
and the adjusted basis of any indebtedness of the corporation to the
shareholder.
Id. (emphasis added).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/14
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requirement is, however, somewhat nebulous when put into practice.', There
is often confusion over whether a present or future economic outlay is
required for an increase in basis of indebtedness 2
BAsis IN STOCK

The Leavitt petitioners argued that their guarantee of the S corporation's
debt was, in substance, a contribution to the equity of the corporation. 3
Related to this contention is the issue of the applicability of debt-equity
principles to shareholder guarantee questions. An analysis of debt-equity
principles is often required to determine whether securities issued by a
corporation are, in substance, debt or equity for taxation purposes.5 4 Also,
albeit less frequently, shareholder loan guarantees can be subject to debtequity analysis. 55
The Code sets forth several factors for determining whether a debtor/
creditor or corporation/shareholder relationship results from some relevant

51. J. EusnCE & J. KuNTZ, supra note 3, at § 10.03[2][i] n.184 (rev. ed.
Cumulative Supp. No. 2, 1988).
52. The quote from Raynor used in the majority's opinion suggests a present
economic outlay. However, as noted in Rev. Rul. 75-144, 1975-1 C.B. 277, when
a shareholder substitutes his or her note for that of a corporation, and subrogation
occurs, the corporation becomes indebted to the shareholder for the face amount
of the note given to the creditor, and the shareholder is allowed a basis step-up.
Id. at 278. In Gilday v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1982), the Tax
Court further noted that subrogation, as per state law, need not occur. Id. at
1297. If a shareholder substitutes his or her note for that of the corporation, and
thus becomes the primary obligor, then the shareholder can increase his or her
basis in indebtedness from the corporation to the shareholder. Id. The court indicated
that a future economic outlay will suffice.
The focus in Gilday and Rev. Rul. 75-144 is really on a decrease in the
shareholder's net worth from incurring an obligation which produces basis, as
opposed to any economic outlay argument. Perhaps a better standard would involve
basis increase when a shareholder's personal net worth has been reduced by assuming
an obligation, as opposed to requiring a certain "economic outlay".
53. 90 T.C. at 212.
54. The taxation issue primarily involves a corporation and shareholder
seeking to have distributions from the corporation treated as payments of interest
and principal to the shareholder. This allows for a deduction to the corporation
for interest and a tax free return of capital to the shareholder, insofar as the
principal portion of the payment is concerned. Debt-equity analysis can reclassify
this situation, treating debt instruments as actual equity contributions. Thus, interest
and principal payments become nondeductible after-tax dividends paid by the corporation and taxable dividend income to the shareholder.
55. Casco Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 534-35 (1st
Cir. 1976); Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 719 (5th Cir.
1972); Smyers v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 189, 198 (1971); Santa Anita Consol. v.
Commissioner, 50 T.C. 436, 550 (1968).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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transaction. 56 Moreover, courts have developed additional factors, 57 none
of which are controlling.58 As the dissent noted, many of these debt-equity
factors were present in Leavitt.59 The primary disputed issue was whether
a court should apply debt-equity principles at any point in a shareholder
guarantee situation to reclassify the guarantee as, in substance, an equity
contribution.
Leavitt held, in direct contradiction to the Eleventh Circuit Selfe decision, that "a shareholder's guarantee of a loan to a subchapter S corporation may not be treated as an equity investment in the corporation
absent an economic outlay by the shareholder." 6 The Leavitt majority
followed a line of cases generally holding that guarantees of corporate debt
will not increase stock basis. 6' It declined to apply debt-equity analysis to
loan guarantees in subchapter S cases, and restricted the use of such
principles to subchapter C corporations. 62 The court explained its refusal
to apply debt-equity principles as based upon congressional intent to limit

56. I.R.C. § 385(b)(1986) provides:
(b) Factors. The regulations prescribed under this section shall set forth
factors which are to be taken into account in determining with respect to
a particular fact situation whether a debtor-creditor relationship exists or
a corporation-shareholder relationship exits. The factors so set forth in
the regulations may include among other factors:
(1) whether there is a written unconditional promise to pay on demand
or on a specified date a sum certain in money in return for an adequate
consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of
interest,
(2) whether there is a subordination to or preference over any indebtedness
of the corporation,
(3) the ratio of debt to equity of the corporation,
(4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and
(5) the relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and
holdings of the interest in question.
57. 90 T.C. at 231. The dissent noted several of these debt-equity factors,
including "(7) the intent of the parties; (8) "thin" or inadequate capitalization;
(9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholders; ... (11) the ability of
the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending institutions; (12) the extent
to which the advance was used to acquire capital assets . . . ." Id.
58. Tyler v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 848 (5th Cir. 1969).
59. 90 T.C. at 232-33.
60. 90 T.C. at 216.
61. Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d 755, 756 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'g 42
T.C.M. (CCH) 1460, 1463-64 (1981); Wheat v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 720,
722-23 (S.D. Tex. 1973); Calcutt v. Commissioner, 84 T.C. 716, 720 (1985);
Blackman v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1512, 1515 (1981); Thompson v.
Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 157, 161 (1977); Duke v. Commissioner, 35
T.C.M. (CCH) 229, 231 (1976); Blum v. Commissioner, 59 T.C. 436, 438 (1972).
62. Id. Although the majority doesn't elaborate further on its refusal, there
could be another reason. Debt-equity analysis was originally developed to deal with
shareholder/corporation transactions that were designed to avoid double taxation
of dividends. See supra note 54. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals extended this
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/14
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deductions for S corporation shareholders.63 Congress used "investment"

as meaning actual economic outlay! 4 Absent such an outlay, the majority
concluded that subchapter S shareholders "could readily skirt the limitation
embodied in section 1374(c) and thereby erect a tax shelter that Congress
never intended to create." 6 5
Essentially, the majority would apply a two step analysis when analyzing
shareholder loan guarantees. First, the shareholder would have the burden
of proving that the substance of the transaction is a loan from the creditor
to the shareholder, who subsequently contributes the funds to the corporation. Second, if applicable, debt-equity principles would determine the
nature of the transaction between the shareholder and the corporation. As
principles
previously noted, the majority would refuse to apply debt-equity
6
to shareholder loan guarantees in the subchapter S area.
Citing Blum v. Commissioner,67 and In re Breit,6 the Leavitt Tax Court

noted that, in past decisions, shareholder guarantees of corporate loans
from banks to S corporations were not considered, in substance, to be
capital contributions! 9 The taxpayers in such cases failed in their burden
of proving that such guarantees were actually loans to the shareholders,
who then contributed such funds to the S corporation.70 Thus, the courts
to prove
never reached the debt-equity issue because the taxpayer failed
7
that the substance of the transaction was not its actual form. 1
The majority of the Tax Court, addressing this issue, indicated certain
factors which may be persuasive in convincing a court that a loan from

a creditor to an S corporation guaranteed by a shareholder, would be, in
substance, an equity contribution by a guarantor. Such factors would include
whether the guarantors could "dispose of the proceeds of the loan as they

wishH," or if payments on the loan were "reported as constructive dividends
on the corporation's Federal income tax returns" or on the guarantors' .72
Unless these, and perhaps other factors, are present, such transactions are

analysis to subchapter C corporations and guarantees of corporate debt in Plantation
Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1972). Finally, this guarantee
analysis was used in a subchapter S context in Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d
769 (11th Cir. 1985). This "three step" transfer of debt-equity analysis from its
origins to subchapter S guarantee issues could be viewed as "stretching" the principle
too far.
63. 90 T.C. at 216.
64. Id. at 216-17. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
65. Id. at 217 (citing Brown v. Commissioner, 706 F.2d at 756).
66. See supra notes 62-65 and accompanying text.
67. 59 T.C. 436, 439 n.4 (1972).
68. 460 F. Supp. 873, 875 (E.D. Va. 1978).
69. 90 T.C. at 215.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 213-14.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989
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to be considered loans from a creditor to an S corporation guaranteed by
73
shareholders.
The majority's decision invites criticism on two points. The first involves
the capital outlay requirement. The court noted that the "petitioners'
guarantees . .. do not constitute cash or other property."

74

Essentially,

insofar as stock basis is concerned, the majority followed Perry v.
Commissioner75 which held that "before any deduction is allowable there
must have occurred some transaction which when fully consummated left
the taxpayer poorer in a material sense." ' 76 This language suggests a required
present economic outlay. However, for purposes of increasing basis in
indebtedness from the corporation to the shareholder, a note subrogation
transaction requires future economic outlayYn This unusual dichotomy, a
"stricter" outlay required for stock basis step-up as opposed to basis in
indebtedness, is not necessarily indicated by the solitary term "investment"
as per the Senate Committee on Finance's report, which is used to refer
to both types of adjusted basis. 78 The Leavitt majority, by using language
that suggests a present economic outlay, may be setting too narrow a
standard given that prior decisions focus more on a decrease in shareholder
net worth as the basis increase standard. 79
The second criticism involves the majority's refusal to apply debt-equity
principles in the subchapter S area. As the dissent pointed out, "all, or
nearly all, subch. S cases cite subeh. C precedent or subch. S precedent
which relied on subch. C precedent." 0 The dissent further commented that
the majority misstated Blum's holding. 8' In Blum, the Tax Court applied
debt-equity principles in determining that the taxpayer failed in his burden
of proof of showing that the substance of the transaction was a loan to
the shareholder, who proceeded to contribute the funds to the corporation.8 2
This reasoning contrasts with the majority's contention that the Blum court
did not apply debt-equity principles because the taxpayer failed in his
burden of proof in first showing that the substance of the transaction was
a loan from the creditor to the shareholder.33 This contrary interpretation

73. Id.
74. Id. at 212.
75. 54 T.C. 1293 (1970).

76. 54 T.C. at 1296 (quoting Home v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 250, 254
(1945)).
77. Although the shareholder who gives his own note in subrogation for

the debt of the corporation has given up "property," the shareholder hasn't, at
present, contributed personal funds. See supra note 50.
78. See supra note 50.

79. See supra note 52.
80. 90 T.C. at 225 n.9.
81. Id.at 222.
82. 59 T.C. at 439-40.
83. 90 T.C. at 222.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol54/iss1/14
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of the Blum holding is also at odds with language in other authority
suggesting that debt-equity considerations may be applicable in determining
the substance of a transaction.14 It is at the very least arguable that debtequity principles should be employed at some point in the analysis to
determine the substance of guaranteed loans. Thus the majority's absolute
refusal to ever consider such principles in an S corporation loan guarantee
situation could lead to difficulty in analyzing unusual S corporation transactions. 5
The dissent posed the opposite argument, that the transaction was, in
substance, a loan from the bank to the shareholders, who then made a
capital contribution of the proceeds.8 6 The primary difference between the
majority and minority opinions was whether debt-equity principles should
be applied. The dissent argued that "[t]raditional debt-equity principles are
applied to determine the substance of a transaction. After making such
determination, the substance of the transaction, not the form, is evaluated
for federal income tax purposes." 817 The dissent noted that it matters little
whether we are dealing with a subchapter S or subchapter C corporation:
"[i]f a guarantee of a corporate debt is in substance a capital contribution,
then it is a capital contribution ... *"I8 According to this view, debtequity principles should be applied to characterize shareholder guarantees
as capital contributions, and such application is an intrinsic part of the
substance over form analysis.
The dissent's analysis is based upon the Fifth Circuit decision of
Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner.9 In Plantation Patterns, an
investment banker guaranteed certain obligations of a newly formed cor-

84. See Selfe v. United States, 778 F.2d at 774; In re Breit, 460 F. Supp.
at 875; Albert v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 591, 595 (1980).
85. The dissent suggests a hypothetical whereby a C corporation has a loan
from a bank guaranteed by a shareholder. Using debt-equity principles in a subchapter C context, the court determines that the debt is, in substance, a capital
contribution, and disallows the interest deduction. If the C corporation becomes
an S corporation, are the interest payments now deductible, considering the majority's refusal to apply debt-equity principles in a subchapter S context? 90 T.C.
at 224 n.7. Another situation could arise when an S corporation shareholderguarantor actually pays part of an obligation on an S corporation loan from a
bank. The shareholder would be able to increase his basis in indebtedness for the
amount of the payment. However, in some circumstances, where the corporation
is virtually insolvent and the shareholder never has any actual intent of demanding
interest or principal payments, shouldn't such a payment be better classified under
debt-equity principles as a capital contribution? Would the majority's refusal to
apply debt-equity principles create a potential tax advantage for the shareholder?
If bankruptcy and dissolution were necessary, would the shareholder's indebtedness
interest be equitable as compared to other creditors?
86. 90 T.C. at 228.
87. Id. at 223-24.
88. Id. at 224.
89. 462 F.2d 712 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972).
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poration so that the corporation would have unsecured debt, and would
thus be able to obtain additional financing. 09 The court looked to traditional
debt-equity principles in recharacterizing the guarantees, noting that the
corporation used a large portion of the debt to purchase capital assets,
that the corporation was thinly capitalized, and that there was identity of
interest between the shareholder and guarantor. 9' The court also placed
significant weight on the fact that the sellers "looked at all times to [the
banker's] guarantees as the real insurance for the notes." 92 Thus, the court
recharacterized a guarantee as an equity contribution, in substance, after
applying debt-equity principles.
Another case following this pattern, and which the Leavitt petitioners
and dissent relied on heavily is In re Lane.93 In In re Lane, the court
applied debt-equity factors to a shareholder guarantee situation, concluding
that it was the shareholders "intent at the time the guaranties were extended
to use the guaranties as short-term substitutes for infusion of more capital
stock." 94 Although in In re Lane the shareholder did eventually pay on
the guarantees, the dissent in Leavitt noted that the crux of the issue was
that debt-equity principles, applied at the time the guarantees were made,
recharacterized the guaranteed debt as a capital contribution. 9
Selfe, a subchapter S case mentioned above, applied the Plantation
Patterns and In re Lane analysis. In Selfe, a subchapter S corporation
received financing from a bank, with the shareholder guaranteeing the
corporation's indebtedness to the bank, and securing the loans with personal
collateral. 96 The corporation never defaulted, even when suffering losses
for three years. 97 The shareholder contended that the loan was, in substance,
made to her, and she then contributed the proceeds to the corporation's
capital. 98 The Eleventh Circuit, following Plantation Patterns, held that a
guarantee may increase the basis in an S corporation where the facts show
that, in substance, the loan was from the creditor to the shareholder, who
then made an equity contribution."0 Central to this determination is that
the "facts indicate that the lender is looking primarily to the stockholder
for repayment." 100 The court applied a "thirteen factor analysis" to de-

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.

462 F.2d at 716.
Id. at 722-23.
Id. at 724.
742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984).
Id. at 1320.
90 T.C. at 226.
778 F.2d at 770-71.
Id. at 771.
Id.
Id.
Id.at 771.
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termine the taxpayer's interest in the corporation.' 0' These debt-equity
factors are then used to determine whether a guarantee is, in substance,

an equity contribution or loan. 0 2 However, the court remanded the case
after concluding that there were still material facts at issue concerning
whether the bank actually looked to the guarantor for repayment, and
whether debt-equity factors indicated that the guarantee was, in substance,
an equity contribution.'0 3
The Leavitt dissent applied the analysis in PlantationPatterns and Selfe
to the Leavitt facts and noted several debt-equity factors showing that the
guarantees were, in substance, equity contributions.'°4 After evaluating these
factors, it concluded that the petitioners should be allowed a stock basis
increase. 05 To determine the amount of the increase, it applied Virginia
State law and found that the shareholder guarantors were "effectively
obligated to pay only their aliquot portion of the indebtedness."'06 With
seven shareholders, two of which were petitioners, each petitioner would
be obligated to pay on one-seventh of the $300,000 debt, or $42,857, which
would be the capital contribution amount.1"7

101. Id. at 773 (citing In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311 (11th Cir. 1984), and Estate
of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1972), for traditional debtequity factors). The thirteen Mixon factors include:
(1)the names given to the certificates evidencing the indebtedness;
(2) the presence or absence of a fixed maturity date;
(3) the source of payments;
(4) the right to enforce payment of principal and interest;
(5) participation in management flowing as a result;
(6) the status of the contribution in relation to regular corporate creditors;
(7) the intent of the parties;
(8) "thin" or adequate capitalization;
(9) identity of interest between creditor and stockholder;
(10) source of interest payments;
(11) the ability of the corporation to obtain loans from outside lending
institutions;
(12) the extent to which the advance was used to acquire capital assets;
and
(13) the failure of the debtor to repay on the due date or to seek a
postponement.
Id. at 402.
102. 778 F.2d at 774.
103. Id. at 775.
104. 90 T.C. at 232. The dissent noted the following factors. The bank was
looking solely to the shareholder/guarantor for repayment because of the financial
strength of the guarantors and the weak condition of the corporation. Id. The
corporation's liabilities significantly exceeded its assets and it was thinly capitalized.
Id. The corporation could not have borrowed funds without outside support. Id.
at 233. And, over half the borrowed funds were used to acquire capital assets or
reduce capital indebtedness. Id. at n.17.
105. 90 T.C. at 234-35.
106. Id. at 235-36.
107. Id. at 236.
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There are two primary criticisms of this approach. The first involves
the use of debt-equity principles in the substance over form argument. As
previously indicated, an essential element in the Selfe and PlantationPatterns
analysis was that the lender looked primarily to the guarantor for repayment.108 However, as a realistic matter, this criteria may never be actually
satisfied even when resorting to debt-equity factors. The lender may never
have a "primary" obligor: as long as someone pays, the lender is satisfied.' °9
Indeed, a plausible retort could be, "If the bank looked primarily to the
shareholder/guarantor, why didn't the bank simply loan the proceeds to
the shareholder and secure the loan with corporate assets?"" 0 From a
practical standpoint, the primary obligor requirement may not be a workable
standard for a shareholder, or court, to attempt to follow.",
The second criticism concerns the majority's economic outlay requirement. The dissent considered this requirement satisfied by the substance
over form determination." 2 But the end result in the dissent's analysis is
that, despite a substance argument, the shareholder is not actually any
worse off financially by a present outlay of funds. Nor is the shareholder
primarily liable on the debt as in a Gilday v. Commissioner"' subrogation
case, and is not obligated for future fund outlays. Additionally, the dissent
conveniently overlooked part of the economic outlay issue addressed in
Selfe. In Selfe, the shareholder provided collateral for the loan." 4 The
court noted that "a guarantor who has pledged stock to secure a loan has
experienced an economic outlay to the extent that the pledged stock is not

108. Selfe, 778 F.2d at 774; Plantation Patterns, 462 F.2d at 724.
109. Bogdanski, Shareholder Guarantees, Interest Deductions, and S Corporation Stock Basis: The Problems with Putnam, 13 J. CORP. TA.X'N 264 (1986).
The courts may ask, "To whom did the lender primarily look for repayment?" But the answer may come back: "The lender didn't care so
long as someone made all the payments." Indeed, one suspects that any
competent loan officer's conditioned reflex in dealing with a closely held
corporation is to demand personal guarantees from every shareholder in
sight; the fact that such credit support is actually given should not in
itself control.
Id. at 269.
110. See id. at 272 (citing Tech. Adv. Mem. 84-43-002 (July 6, 1984)).
111. Id.
112. 90 T.C. at 230. The dissent noted that "[i]n such a situation, the
shareholder/guarantor's deemed transfer of the loan proceeds to the corporation
is the economic outlay." Id.
However, the same statutory concerns of the majority are resurrected: Congress
used the term "investment" in the 1958 Senate proposal, S. REP. No. 1983, 85th
Cong., 2d Sess. 87, reprinted in 1958 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws 4791,
5008, which the majority found implied a present material outlay need occur. 90
T.C. at 217.
113. 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1295 (1982). See supra note 52 for a description of
the basis effects of a note subrogation transaction.
114. 778 F.2d at 771.
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available as collateral for other investments. The guarantor ... has lost
the time value or use of its collateral.""15 In Leavitt, there was no pledge
of collateral for the notes, making it distinguishable from Selfe. The
petitioners' and dissent's arguments concerningthe economic outlay concept
appear less persuasive in light of the statutory language in the Senate Report
mentioned above, and the recognition in Selfe of the use of personal assets
as collateral to satisfy the capital outlay requirement.
CONCLUSION

Despite the Selfe decision and the holdings in Plantation Patterns and
In re Breit, the Leavitt decision suggests that "Selfe should not be relied

upon for planning purposes, even for taxpayers in the Eleventh Circuit.
Instead, a direct loan to the shareholder and either a loan or contribution

to the corporation is the proper planning technique." 11 6 Another appropriate
planning technique would be to consider a Gilday-type transaction, and
let the shareholder subrogate his note for that of the corporation. The
subrogation could occur, with the lender's consent, at any time. Further,
7
this subrogation technique appears to be supported by better authority."
As a final planning point, it should be noted that not all is lost should
a subchapter S corporation shareholder fail to realize all possible losses
because of a lack of basis. In light of the Subchapter S Revision Act of
1982,118 planning to achieve maximum loss deductions is less critical due
to the provision for carryover of losses, a provision not in effect at the
time Leavitt arose." 9
Even with academic approval of the rational and result in Selfe,120 the
majority of jurisdictions, as well as the Tax Court, have authority rejecting
the substance over form argument for loan guarantees.12 ' Courts have heavily
relied on the economic outlay criteria, and will probably require some
actual monetary detriment before allowing basis increase.'2

115. Id. at 772-73 n.7.
116. August, "Selfe" Reflections: The Search for Basis for S Shareholder
Guarantees of Corporate Indebtedness, 3 J. PART. TAX'N 260, 265 (1986).
117. See supra note 52.
118. Pub. L. No. 97-354, § 2, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
119. The Code now provides for a suspension of losses that exceed shareholder's basis in a tax period, and allows them to be offset against gain in future
periods. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2) (1986). Pre-1982 law did not provide for such carrying
forward: losses not taken were lost forever. Thus, much of the urgency and need
for arguing substance over form in guarantee situations in order to get as much
net operating loss as possible appears to have been blunted.
120. J. EusncE & J. KuNTz, supra note 3, at § 10.03 [2][i] (referring to
Selfe as a "well reasoned decision").
121. See cases cited supra notes 41 and 47.
122. See cases cited supra note 60: see also supra notes 61-65 and accompanying
text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1989

15

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 54, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 14

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

Should S corporation shareholders attempt a substance over form argument in a guarantee context, the requirements of Selfe should be followed
closely. Of some significance would be the use of collateral in the guarantee
transaction to attempt to meet the economic outlay requirement. 23 Moreover, the substance over form argument should be restricted to attempted
increases in stock basis, and not basis of indebtedness.2 4 In the basis of
indebtness context, the argument lacks precedential authority. 2 5 In addition,
as the factors comprising the argument are fufilled, the characterization
of the contribution as a loan becomes more superficial. The very factors
used in Selfe and PlantationPatterns, traditional debt-equity principles and
the guarantor as primary obligor requirement, would work against a substance over form argument attempting to recast a guarantee as a loan from
the shareholder to the corporation. The more debt-equity principles show
that the creditor looked primarily to the guarantor for repayment, the more
they show that such a loan to the corporation should be recast as an
equity contribution. 26 Paradoxically, arguments which seek to increase a
sharholder's basis in an S corporation are best made in the context of
stock-basis precedent. Even this precedent, however, is hostile. 27
MICHAEL SCHULDT

123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

See supra notes 114-15 and accompanying text.
Comment, supra note 6, at 1264.
See id.
See supra note 85.
It should be noted that the Selfe decision is the only recorded case to

allow an increase in shareholder stock basis for a guarantee of a loan, and only
under very limited facts. Moreover, the Selfe court did not actually decide the case
on the facts: critical issues were still in dispute, and the case was remanded for
further proceedings. See supra notes 96-103 and accompanying text.
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